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“I think the best use of the Guard right now is doing what they are doing. And that is working 
in what we call a Title 32 status for the governors of their states and then dealing with the 
challenges that the governor needs them to deal with at the state and local level.”
 —Secretary of Defense Mark Esper1
Abstract
Since Hurricane Katrina, military emergency managers have warned that military guidance 
does not adequately inform National Guard employment in large-scale, nationally significant 
disasters. The COVID-19 pandemic has turned this hypothetical assertion into a practical 
shortcoming.  While there is very little debate that COVID-19 is a nationally significant natural 
disaster, there are still doctrinal obstacles to adjudicating the military’s responsibility to provide 
national, state, or local disaster assistance. The United States must be prepared for the next 
nationally significant threat. For the next COVID-threat there must be a way to adjudicate 
conversation between lead federal agencies, the DoD, and the National Guard in order to better 
source Guard resources for large-scale, complex disasters.
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In the first few days of April 2020, 17 states were authorized federal reimbursement for calling 
up their National Guards. Another 28 had requests pending. These states took the initiative 
to take advantage of a bill that professed to include $1.5 billion for National Guard response. 
Congress finalized this bill in late March as National Guard leaders charged the DoD to use the 
funds as soon as they are authorized. While legislators, the press, and vocal city executives pled 
for federal relief, National Guard emergency managers fretted over a doctrinal ambiguity that 
still appeared to be unresolved over 60 days after the first coronavirus case was confirmed in 
the United States. Comptrollers, fiscal and property officers, and judge advocates in National 
Guard headquarters across the county were abuzz with discussions relating to section 502(f) 
of Title 32. This critical paragraph in U.S. Code lay at the center of an emergency management 
discussion that still remained shrouded in uncertainty.
After each national emergency, Guard leaders find themselves navigating opaque authorities 
within Title 32, “National Guard,” and Title 42, “The Public Health and Welfare.” The after-action 
report for the SARS-CoV-2 virus response should question why it took over 60 days to enable 
federal funding of the Guard, what the criteria for federal funding are, and what the criteria 
are to transition back to local funding. It should also question why it took political pressure and 
presidential intervention for a process that should have been clearly defined in existing Title 42 
(and Title 32) disaster legislation.2
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Since Hurricane Katrina, almost every effort to federally fund the National Guard has been 
equally complicated. The National Guard Bureau’s (NGB) senior emergency manager worked to 
ensure the 2020 response to COVID-19 was not a bureaucratic repetition of the last 15 years. 
NGB’s director of operations pushed out guidance, reminding states that federal funding would 
be available if: 1) “POTUS declares your state a major federal disaster”; 2) “FEMA validates your 
request(s) in the form of Mission Assignment(s);” and 3) the FEMA request is received by “DoD 
for validation and sourcing which is required for the authority to execute in a reimbursable 
status.” Although it may appear unseemly to worry about reimbursable status, emergency 
managers at all levels must remain mindful of this critical component to disaster response. 
Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) administrators will still be accountable 
to the American taxpayer after all national emergencies. Authority and funding are central 
considerations to all military response in a disaster.
The Secretary of Defense delegated the final FEMA-mission-assignment approval step to the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, who pledged to 
provide approval promptly upon receiving the FEMA mission assignment. At the same time, 
much-publicized memoranda from the White House clarified the President’s intention to assist 
state governors with “one hundred percent federal cost share” for “emergency assistance 
activities associated with preventing, mitigating, and responding to the threat to public health 
and safety posed by the virus that these States and this territory undertake using their National 
Guard forces.” The presidential memos point to 42 U.S.C. §403 and §503, as if to imply that 
these paragraphs open an avenue to federal funding of the National Guard. In reality, these 
paragraphs merely allow FEMA to reimburse states for placing their National Guard on state 
active duty. 42 U.S.C. §403 does allow the President to direct the Secretary of Defense to 
employ the resources of the DoD, performing emergency work, but only “for a period not to 
exceed 10 days.” As such, the President’s memos go on to direct the SECDEF, “to the maximum 
extent feasible” and “pursuant to 32 U.S.C. 502(f)” to request that governors order their 
guardsmen to perform duty in support of mission assignments from FEMA to the DoD. While 
this top-down direction is counter to the bottom-up philosophy behind the nation’s National 
Response Framework, it did at least appear to open up the authority the governors needed 
to federally fund their National Guards. It remains to be seen if the DoD will be properly 
reimbursed for these activities.
Discussion of Guard activation in the homeland is often obscured by repeated efforts to draw 
parallels between state active duty and duty in a federally funded, Title 32, status. Disparities 
and inequities in these two duty statuses are repeatedly debated with scant consideration to 
the underlying doctrinal and legal authorities. These conversations are not without merit, but 
they obscure a larger doctrinal confusion that is more central to military action in the homeland. 
Whether Guardsmen respond in state active duty or in a federally funded status depends more 
upon whether their action is homeland defense, or homeland security.3 This distinction lays at 
the center of successful military action in the homeland.
Homeland defense has been an enduring mission for the nation’s military since the earliest 
days of the militia. Fans of the movie Red Dawn can easily envision the doctrinal space this 
fictional threat implies. Whether the threat is an intercontinental ballistic missile, or a Bear 
Bomber racing towards the U.S. mainland, or Russian paratroopers landing in Colorado, the 
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DoD clearly has preeminence in planning, organizing, training and equipping for this mission 
space. Homeland defense is supported by clear language within the U.S. Code that enables 
clear action for the DoD and for select mission areas attributed to the Guard. The governors’ 
authority in accomplishing small-scale homeland security actions in their states is comparably 
efficient. Conversely, Guard roles in large-scale-homeland security and Defense Support to Civil 
Authorities (DSCA) are not so clear cut. The limitations to National Guard action under Title 
32 authorities—and reimbursement restrictions in the Stafford Act under Title 42—need to be 
resolved for enduring solutions to Guard action in the homeland.
Enabling Guard Action: Short Term Solutions
To better facilitate Guard action in the homeland, doctrine needs to be amended. Ultimately, 
these doctrinal improvements should originate in legislation, but some short-term solutions 
should be pursued in the interim.
The DoD abandoned efforts to create a stand-alone doctrine for homeland security in 2009, 
and although there is significant homeland security discussion in Joint Publication 3-28: 
Defense Support to Civil Authorities, this rightfully focuses on DoD action in the homeland, 
not National Guard action. Practically speaking, there is very little precedence for the Guard 
accomplishing DSCA. DSCA is the culmination of a process that originates in a state’s request 
for assistance, validated by a lead federal agency who then issues a mission assignment to 
the DoD. The lead federal agency for the coronavirus pandemic is the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services. DSCA for the Guard requires the DoD to then assign this mission 
to the Guard without any assurance of reimbursement during the current fiscal cycle. Outside 
of the lead federal agency mission assignment process, the DoD is even further constrained. 
The DoD’s legal and fiscal constraints place it in a difficult position. In April, the Office of the 
Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) issued guidance associated with the Coronavirus Aid, 
Relief, and Economic Security Act, reminding service comptrollers that the DoD does not receive 
appropriations for, and has no authority to provide support to, other Federal departments and 
agencies, or to State, local, territorial, or tribal governments in preventing, preparing for, or 
responding to the coronavirus on a non-reimbursable basis.
As a consequence of the limitations imposed upon the DoD, it has approved DSCA missions for 
the Guard less than 10 times since Hurricane Katrina. The DoD consistently asserts that neither 
it nor Congress has the legal authority to appropriate funding for the governors’ use of their 
Guards accomplishing DSCA. The response to COVID-19 once again illustrates how the National 
Guard accomplishing DSCA is almost fiscally impossible and occurs through conversations that 
are at odds with the bottom-up premise of the National Response Framework. The President’s 
memo forces the SECDEF and the Secretary of Homeland Security to look for ways to align 
National Guard resources to requests for assistance from the States, but it may not be legally 
sufficient to fully reimburse DoD for referring the mission assignments to the Guard component. 
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These barriers and inconsistencies lead to the conclusion that DSCA doctrine is an inadequate 
guide for guardsmen operating in the homeland. In advance of clear, legislative guidance for 
Guard action in large-scale, complex disasters, DoD and DHS leaders must look for modes to 
augment DoD funding in disasters and ways to differentiate between federal and state equities.4
Reiterating the DoD’s lack of funding for homeland security and DSCA missions, doctrinal 
improvements will still be at the mercy of fiscal constraints within the DoD’s budget. An 
emergency like a COVID-19 pandemic transcends treatment as purely a state matter, and the 
DoD must have a mechanism to fund the Guard. Defense Directive 3160.01, Homeland Defense 
Activities Conducted by the National Guard instructs governors and senior military leaders 
in matters of homeland defense. New guidance should be equally instructive for nationally 
significant matters of homeland security and DSCA, and should provide fiscal solutions. Clearly, 
room exists for a new complementary defense directive called Homeland Security Activities 
Conducted by the National Guard.
After the 2017 hurricane season, senior leaders in at NGB looked for creative solutions for 
employing Guard personnel within current authorities that were not shackled by ambiguous 
DoD guidance. Without running afoul of the training mandates in the U.S. Code, NGB leaders 
looked for avenues to federally fund Guard response. In September 2018, the Chief of the 
National Guard Bureau (CNGB) published Guidance Regarding Authority to Conduct Training 
during National Guard Civil Support (NGCS) Operations for Domestic Disaster Response. This 
memo sought to clarify existing guidance that gives the adjutants general discretion in using 
training funds. He reminded them that training activities could have a secondary benefit 
including actions in response to domestic disasters.5  Here, the CNGB provided guidance 
to Guard commanders by reminding them that activities accomplished to achieve service 
“warfighting” objectives could have incidental operational benefits for their state when the 
training coincided with a disaster or other planned event. Unfortunately, the CNGB’s efforts 
have been undermined by contemporary legal and fiscal caveats that hamper subsequent 
state response. As a consequence, adjutants general have to be cautious and deliberate in how 
they exercise this authority, as these training funds are distributed primarily by the services to 
accomplish their national security—not disaster response—objectives.
A discussion of the legal authorities behind the funds for Guard actions in the homeland 
helps to explain the services’ distribution of training funds. Title 32, U.S. Code, is the source 
document for most of these authorities. Chapter 5 specifically describes training activities for 
the Guard. The 1964 revisions to the code have had important implications for domestic Guard 
employment. Differentiating between the authorities in the modern U.S. Code is still a matter of 
debate, but a good working example is summarized briefly in Table 1. This table shows how the 
CNGB’s guidance attempted to clarify the application of training authorities and funding in the 
U.S. Code, specifically the ability to provide “an incidental operational benefit.”6  It proposes that 
events—such as natural disasters—could provide meaningful, necessary training for wartime 
readiness while benefitting state governors and providing adjutants general with clearer 
guidance on their authority to repurpose local funds under U.S. Code authority. 
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Table 1:Explanation of 32 U.S.C. § 502: Required Drills and Field Exercises7
The proposition presupposes warfighting training value commensurate with the goals of 32 
U.S.C. § 502(a). While this clarifying language is valuable, DoD and Guard participation in disaster 
response is still an unanticipated requirement beyond the services’ normal budget.8 Subsection (f) 
does not create new disaster funding but provides latitude within existing training guidance and 
broader authorities within the existing budgetary allocation. The CNGB’s guidance needs to be 
taken further to ensure this fiscal impasse does not restrain military support in disasters.
The CNGB’s guidance is, nevertheless, valuable. DoD and Guard comptrollers are well versed 
in submitting out-of-cycle requests to cover unfunded or unanticipated events. For example, 
the DoD submitted a multi-billion-dollar supplemental budget request in 2017 that included a 
wide range of requirements, from additions to overseas campaigns to unanticipated activities 
including repairs to storm-damaged military infrastructure.9  It follows that Guard personnel 
pressed into duty to accomplish nationally significant homeland security activities—beyond the 
services’ initial budgetary estimates—could use supplemental funding measures in years where 
natural disasters strain the DoD’s budget. 
In advance of modifications to the Stafford Act or Title 32, U.S. Code, homeland security 
administrators must be able to supplement the DoD’s budget in times of disaster. After 9/11, 
with a focus on prosecuting the war on terror, Congress proposed the Defense Emergency 
Response Fund (DERF) as a means to supplement homeland security funding for the DoD.10   
The DERF was an effective tool for providing the DoD with fiscal elasticity. Unfortunately, DERF’s 
purpose was tied too closely to counterterrorism activities and it was rarely used to defray the 
costs of disasters. The fund has been discontinued and DERF references removed from DoD 
guidance. Nevertheless, as defense comptrollers consider budgetary targets for future defense 
appropriations, an allocation to a DERF-like line of accounting could provide a mechanism to 
federally fund National Guard actions in the homeland. As legislators consider future national 
defense authorization acts, there is an opportunity to resurrect DERF or define a substitute 
better able to reimburse DoD and Guard domestic actions. The 2020 CARES Act could have been 
written to provide direct supplemental funding to the DoD, or could have been used to bolster 
the DERF, enabling expedited 502(f)(2) funding to states’ National Guards.
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Beyond the funding, there must be clear authority. The President’s memo cut through a great 
deal of red-tape, but does not create a clear roadmap for navigating future national disasters. 
Unfortunately, the memorandum was not born from clearly understood criteria for defining 
federal and state equities. As a consequence, state legislators have fought to retain the 
President’s pledge for one hundred percent federal reimbursement. In the latter months of 
2020, President Trump’s efforts to reduce the cost share to a 75:25 federal-to-state share have 
not been well received. There needs to be a systematic mode of adjudicating whether disasters 
are national, federal-matters, or localized matters; during initial response and after recovery 
operations have normalized. 
National Special Security Events provide a model for engaging in federalism conversations 
critical to DoD and Guard action in the homeland. The United States Secret Service developed 
questionnaires and checklists that allow state executives an opportunity to engage in structured 
deliberation on matters of federal and state equity. These conversations clarify the level of 
federal participation anticipated and draw distinctions based on the event size, location, 
duration, threat environment, and the availability of state or local resources. Intuitively, similar 
differentiating criteria could adjudicate the line between state and federal matters in natural 
disasters, pandemics, or other significant threats to domestic security. These new criteria 
would become prerequisites for state executives, the DoD, and DHS to access National Guard 
capabilities under appropriate funding and authorities.
Despite the DoD’s fiscal constraints in matters of homeland security and in the absence of a 
mode of dialogue adjudicating federal or state matters, there is some precedent for resolving 
both of these challenges. DoD, DHS and National Guard leaders must work to develop clarifying 
guidance aimed at piercing these obstacles to domestic action. The CNGB’s staff worked to 
create guidance relating to “incidental support,” and this should be further clarified. There 
are existing models to augment DoD appropriations, and the Secret Service has a model to 
resolve whether an event has a federal nexus. All of these examples point toward short-term 
collaboration that could significantly improve and facilitate Guard action during large-scale, 
complex disasters.
An Enduring Solution to Guard Action
Large-scale, complex natural disaster planning should press military doctrinarians to consider 
how federalism plays into response. These scenarios should challenge DHS, DoD, and Guard 
planners to consider which threats to the United States are parochial concerns and which 
ones are national matters. Beyond matters of federalism and doctrinal homeland security and 
homeland defense demarcations, fiscal considerations permeate all disaster conversations. 
A major obstacle to employing the Guard in large-scale disasters stems from the inability to 
federally fund its activation. Guard personnel serve the military as part-time employees, so 
any activation beyond their core warfighting training needs external funding. The pay and 
allowances of activated Guard personnel accomplishing homeland security are unplanned 
appropriations outside the DoD’s normal budget. Additionally, the DoD cannot seek 
reimbursement for pay and allowances through appeals to the Stafford Act. Guard activation 
in state active duty is doctrinally clean but produces crushing administrative challenges for 
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states, creates disparity in responder benefits, and might bankrupt states responding to 
nationally significant, catastrophic disasters. The COVID-19 pandemic is a perfect storm of 
a nationally significant disaster and fiscally crippled state economies that demands a more 
enduring fiscal solution.
Recent modifications to Title 32 of the U.S. Code to clarify the Guard’s action in homeland defense 
serve as a model worth emulating and a means to solving the funding challenges with Guard 
action. Sections 901–908 of Title 32, U.S. Code, provide legal and financial guidelines for Guard 
action in matters of homeland defense. Revisions to 32 U.S.C. §112 have similarly informed 
National Guard counter-drug operations while revisions to 10 U.S.C. § 12310(c) have enabled 
National Guard “Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams.” Specialized teams like these, 
distributed throughout the states, have similarly instructive legal and financial authority guiding 
their actions in a broad range of homeland defense and homeland security missions. 
Title 10 of the U.S. Code requires that the DoD develop a plan for funding capabilities.11 
The SECDEF is directed to provide the funds and resources necessary to employ the active 
components and the reserve components in homeland defense, domestic emergency response, 
and “military support to civil authorities.”12 However, because Congress does not appropriate 
funds for the DoD to accomplish disaster response operations, the secretary of defense must 
fund these operations with an empty purse. This imperative should be pressed further, and the 
language in Title 10 and Title 32 of the U.S. Code needs to be further refined to provide greater 
clarity for the Guard. As an equal member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CNGB should not have 
to interpret U.S. Code to enable Guard action. Title 32 must be modified to reference explicitly 
the Guard acting under the authority prescribed in § 502(f) and supporting nationally significant 
homeland security actions. This new language should serve as the basis for revisions to DoD 
doctrine, open the door to stand-alone homeland security doctrine relating to Guard action, 
and drive improvements to DoD instructions and directives. Furthermore, from a practical 
perspective, this improvement would empower the DoD to include an annual appropriation for 
the federally funded burden of Guard personnel acting within these mission areas. 
If the Guard is to be a practical partner of the DoD in DSCA or empowered to conduct federally 
funded homeland security independent of DoD action, then refinement of the Stafford Act or 
disaster lines of accounting within the DoD budget must be considered. If practical, there is 
a solid argument for mission assignments from a lead federal agency directly to the National 
Guard. Legal accounting mechanisms like DERF could serve as effective disaster response tools 
and provide the DoD with fiscal elasticity.
Conclusion
DSCA is an action in which the DoD provides support to a lead federal agency supporting 
homeland security. The lead federal agency’s jurisdiction in this doctrinal space implies support 
of a nationally significant nature. However, despite several arguments supporting Guard 
preeminence in matters of homeland security, guardsmen cannot be easily accessed because 
the DoD is not funded to source the Guard in this mission space. The DoD is also unable to 
access disaster funding from the Stafford Act to reimburse it for unplanned DSCA assistance 
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from the Guard. Moreover, the doctrine is understandably loath to encroach on the governors’ 
authority over the state Guards while silent on modes of dialogue and coordination that could 
result in cooperation between state and DoD planners accomplishing homeland security or 
DSCA actions. Additionally, DSCA—Guard action subordinate to DoD mission assignments—
is too narrow to accommodate operations like the Katrina response, where the Guard 
accomplished governor-directed, governor-controlled homeland security in a federally funded, 
Title 32 status. The DoD’s lack of authority over the non-federalized Guard should serve as a 
doorway to federal and state dialogue and not be seen as an insurmountable legal barrier. If the 
United States is to prepare for nationally significant threats, like COVID-19, it must find a way to 
adjudicate conversation between lead federal agencies, the DoD, and the National Guard. There 
must be modes of dialogue that help to adjudicate between homeland security, homeland 
defense and defense support to civil authorities. Ultimately, new legislation will facilitate new 
doctrine that must provide clear guidance to state adjutants general, the NGB, and the services 
for how to enter into these conversations and aid in better sourcing Guard resources for large-
scale, complex disasters.
About the Author
Paul Jara is the Director of Staff for the Arkansas Air National Guard.  In his previous 
assignment, he was the Deputy Director of Military Support for the Arkansas National Guard 
and participated in several national planning exercises to ensure Guardsmen were postured to 
succeed in local, state, or national disasters. He can be reached at paul.jara@us.af.mil.
Disclaimer  The views and opinions of the author are his own and do not necessarily reflect  
the position of the United States Air Force, the Arkansas Air National Guard, nor the  
Department of Defense.
Homeland Security Affairs | Special Covid-19 Issue 2020 | WWW.HSAJ.ORG
10 How Should The National Guard Be Employed for 
The Next National Disaster?  |  By Paul Jara
Bibliography
Burke, Ryan, and Sue McNeil. Toward a Unified Military Response: Hurricane Sandy and the Dual Status 
Commander. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2015.
Department of Defense. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. DoD Directive 3025.18. Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2018.
———. Homeland Defense Activities Conducted by the National Guard. DoD Directive 3160.01. 
Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2017. https://www.hsdl.org/? 
abstract&did=.
———. Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force. DoD Directive 1200.17. Washington, 
DC: Department of Defense, 2008. https://www.hsdl.org/? 
view&did=233708.
———. Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities. Washington, DC: Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense, February 2013. https://fas.org/man/eprint/homedefstrat.pdf.
———. The Use of the National Guard for Defense Support of Civil Authorities. DoD Instruction 3025.22. 
Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2017.
Executive Office of the President. Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council. 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 1. Washington, DC: White House, 2001. https://www.
hsdl.org/?view&did=1132.
———. Organization of the National Security Council System. National Security Presidential Directive 1. 
Washington, DC: White House, 2001. https://www.hsdl. 
org/?view&did=462808.
———. Presidential Decision Directive 62/NSC-62 (Washington, DC: National Security Council, May 22, 
1998), 11, https://ia801304.us.archive.org/29/items/ 
PresidentialDecisionDirective62PDD-62/Presidential%20Decision% 
20Directive%2062%20(PDD-62).pdf.
Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action Report. Washington, 
DC: Department of Homeland Security, July 12, 2018. https://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/1533643262195-6d1398339449ca 
85942538a1249d2ae9/2017FEMAHurricaneAARv20180730.pdf.
———. National Incident Management System. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
2017. https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/ 
1508151197225-ced8c60378c3936adb92c1a3ee6f6564/FINAL_NIMS_2017.pdf.
———. National Response Framework. 3rd ed. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
2016.
Homeland Security Affairs | Special Covid-19 Issue 2020 | WWW.HSAJ.ORG
11 How Should The National Guard Be Employed for 
The Next National Disaster?  |  By Paul Jara
Government Accountability Office. Defense Budget: Tracking of Emergency Response Funds for the War 
on Terrorism. GAO-03-346. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, April 30, 2003. 
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-346.
Jara, Paul. A Framework for National Guard Employment in the Homeland. Monterey, CA.  
Naval Postgraduate School, March 2019.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Civil Support. Joint Publication 3-28. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2007.
———. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. Joint Publication 3-28. Washington, DC:  
Department of Defense, 2013.
———. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. Joint Publication 3-28. Washington, DC:  
Department of Defense, 2018. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/ 
Doctrine/pubs/jp3_28.pdf?ver=2018-11-29-083820-613.
———. Homeland Defense. Joint Publication 3-27. Washington, DC: United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2013.
———. Homeland Security. Joint Publication 3-26. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2005. 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=456038.
Lengyel, Joseph, and Michael Taheri. Guidance Regarding Authority to Conduct Training during National 
Guard Civil Support (NGCS) Operations for Domestic Disaster Response. Arlington, VA: National 
Guard Bureau, September 14, 2018.
Lowenberg, Timothy. The Role of the National Guard in National Defense and Homeland Security. 
Washington, DC: National Guard Association, September 1, 2005.
Martin, Ted, and Corey Thomas, eds. Domestic Operational Law: 2018 Handbook for Judge Advocates. 
Charlottesville, VA: Center for Law and Military Operations, 2018.
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). Request for Additional FY 2017 Appropriations: 
United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request. Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, March 16, 2017. https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/
Documents/defbudget/fy2017/marchAmendment/FY17_March_Amendment.pdf.
Rofrano, Christian. 2019 Domestic Operations Law and Policy. 2nd ed. Arlington, VA: National Guard 
Bureau, 2018.
Rofrano, Christian, Marc Koblentz, Robert Kavanaugh, Hugo Teufel, and Charles Young. Domestic Disaster 
Response 2017, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria: Lessons Learned for Judge Advocates. 
Charlottesville, VA: Center for Law and Military Operations, 2018.
Woodruff, Judy. “Defense Sec. Mark Esper on mobilizing the U.S. military to fight COVID-19” PBS News 
Hour, PBS.org, 19 Mar 2020, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/defense-sec-mark-esper-on-
mobilizing-the-u-s-military-to-fight-covid-19.
Homeland Security Affairs | Special Covid-19 Issue 2020 | WWW.HSAJ.ORG
12 How Should The National Guard Be Employed for 
The Next National Disaster?  |  By Paul Jara
Endnotes
1.  Judy Woodruff, “Defense Sec. Mark Esper on mobilizing the U.S. military to fight COVID-19” PBS News Hour, PBS.org, 19 
Mar 2020, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/defense-sec-mark-esper-on-mobilizing-the-u-s-military-to-fight-covid-19 .
2.  This paper expands upon arguments relating to National Guard action in large-scale disasters as described in work done 
in completion of a masters in Homeland Security from the Naval Postgraduate School. The full thesis can be accessed at 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/62258 .
3.  Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, Joint Publication 3-28 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 
2013), I-2 to I-4, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_28.pdf? 
ver=2018-11-29-083820-613.
4.  DHS is the Lead Federal Agency for the majority of domestic disasters. The Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) is the lead federal agency for the COVID-19 pandemic response.
5.  Joseph Lengyel and Michael Taheri, Guidance Regarding Authority to Conduct Training during National Guard Civil Support 
(NGCS) Operations for Domestic Disaster Response (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, September 14, 2018).
6.  Lengyel and Taheri, Authority to Conduct Training.
7.  DoDI 1215.06 and DoDI 3025.22 are silent on the distinction between 32 U.S.C. § 502(f)(1) and § 502(f)(2) despite these 
distinctions in the U.S. Code. According to a 2019 primer produced by the National Guard Bureau, the “President and the 
SecDef have authority to authorize operational missions under 32 U.S.C. §502(f)(2).” This legal primer also describes DSCA 
by proposing that the “DOD 3025 series of publications govern providing DSCA to a qualifying entity and primarily apply to 
response under Title 10 and 32 U.S.C. §502(f)(2).” ;Rofrano, 2019 Domestic Operations Law and Policy, 219. Although the 
previous reference implies the CNGB has authority to approve § 502(f)(1), considerable debate that refutes this position 
has not been resolved at the time of this writing. 
8.  Department of Defense, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 2013, E-4.
9.  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Request for Additional FY 2017 Appropriations: United States 
Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 16, 2017), 3, 
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/ 
defbudget/fy2017/marchAmendment/FY17_March_Amendment.pdf.
10.  Government Accountability Office, Defense Budget: Tracking of Emergency Response Funds for the War on Terrorism, 
GAO-03-346 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, April 30, 2003), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-
03-346.
11. 10 U.S.C. § 1815(a)–(d) (Supp. V 2006).
12. 10 U.S.C. § 113 (2018).
Copyright
Copyright © 2020 by the author(s). Homeland Security Affairs is an academic journal available free of charge to 
individuals and institutions. Because the purpose of this publication is the widest possible dissemination of knowledge, 
copies of this journal and the articles contained herein may be printed or downloaded and redistributed for personal, 
research or educational purposes free of charge and without permission. Any commercial use of Homeland Security 
Affairs or the articles published herein is expressly prohibited without the written consent of the copyright holder. The 
copyright of all articles published in Homeland Security Affairs rests with the author(s) of the article. Homeland Security 
Affairs is the online journal of the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS).
Cover photo by Kelly Sikkema on Unsplash
